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ABSTRACT
One of the most prominent features of U.S. unionism is the key role
played by seniority. However, in cross—sectional data, the positive
association between seniority and earnings is typically much stronger for
nonunion workers than for union workers. This finding has puzzled previous
researchers, since it seems inconsistent with the generalization that
seniority is more important in the union sector than in the nonunion sector.
We show that standard estimates of the return to seniority are likely to be
biased upward and argue that the bias is likely to be larger in the nonunion
sector than in the union sector. Corrected estimates imply that the return to
seniority is, in fact, larger in the union sector than in the nonunion sector.
Katharine G. Abraham Henry S. Farber
The Brookings Institution Department of Economics
1778 Massachusetts Avenue, NW MIT
Washington, DC 20036 Cambridge, MA 021391
I. Introduction
A prominent feature of U.S. unionism is the key role played by
seniority. As early as the 1920's and 1930's, replacing foreman's discretion
with a seniority—based reward structure was an important focus of theemerging
union movement.' Modern theories of union behavior emphasize thestrength of
senior workers' influence on union objectives (Farber, 1978; Blair and
Crawford, 1984; Freeman and )ledoff, 1984; Farber, 1986). Recent evidence
indicates that seniority is indeed substantially more important in both
layoffs and promotions under collective bargaining than in its absence
(Abraham and Medoff, 1984, 1985). The major exception to the generalization
that seniority is more important in the union sector than in the nonunion
sector is the finding, replicated by a number of researchers using different
data sets, that the slope of the seniority—earnings profile ina cross—section
is steeper for nonunion workers than for union workers.2
In this study, we challenge the finding that the returns to seniority
are greater among nonunion workers than among union workers. Elsewhere
(Abraham and Farber, 1987), we argue that standard cross—section estimates of
the returns to seniority are biased upwards, and we provide evidence that this
bias is quite important for nonunion workers.Here, we argue that this bias
is larger for nonunion workers than for union workers and that the true
returns to seniority are larger among union workers than among nonunion
workers. In the next section we present a discussion of the sources of bias
1. Slichter (1941) offers an insightful discussion of union attitudes
towards seniority rules. See also Gersuny (1981).
2. Representative studies include Leigh (1978),Borjas(1979), and
Pfeffer and Ross (1980), all using the National Longitudinal Survey of Mature
Men; Farber (1983) using the Quality of Employment Survey; Polachek (1983)
using the Panel Study of Income Dynamics; and Mellow (1983) using the May 1979
Current Population Survey. Many of these studies are summarized in Lewis
(1986)2
in the standard estimates of the return to seniority, and we discuss why the
bias is expected to be larger for nonunion workers in section III.
In section IV we develop two alternative approaches to deriving
consistent estimates of the return to seniority. Both approaches depend on a
measure of completed job duration that we construct using data from the
Michigan Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) based on the estimation of
separate Weibull proportional hazards models for the union and nonunion
sectors. The construction of these job duration measures is described in
Section V of the paper. Section VI contains the paper's central results
regarding the estimation of separate earnings functions for union and nonunion
males in blue—collar jobs from the PSID.
The results are in line with our expectations. In standard cross
section earnings equations fit for samples of blue collar workers, the
estimated return to seniority is larger for the nonunion group than for the
union group. However, once the upward bias in these standard estimates is
taken into account, we find that the returns to seniority are larger for union
blue collar workers than for nonunion blue collar workers.
II. Bias in Cross-Section Earnings Functions
We turn now to a simple model of the sources of bias in cross-section
estimates of the return to seniority. Such bias may arise from unmeasured
individual differences in earnings and/or from unmeasured job/match
differences in earnings. Individual heterogeneity will cause an upward bias
in the estimated return to seniority if more able individuals both earn higher
wages and stay longer on their jobs. Job/match heterogeneity will cause an
upward bias if workers on good jobs or in good matches both earn more and stay
longer on their jobs. The model illustrates the contribution of three factors
to the magnitude of the upward bias in the estimated return to seniority.3
These factors are 1) the degree to which ability is rewarded withhigher pay,
2) the variance in ability in the sample population, and 3) the variancein
the job/match component in earnings.
Suppose that the earnings of a particular worker on a particular job at
a particular point in time can be written:






= ajob specific error term representing the excess of earnings
received by this person on this job over and above the earnings
that could be expected on a randomly selected job,
= aperson/job/time—period specific error term,
=indexof individuals,
j=indexof jobs,
t =indexof years within jobs,
A's =returnsto seniority and to pre—job experience, and
a =returnsto unobserved ability.
For simplicity of exposition, other factors that might influenceearnings are
omitted from the model and all variables are assumed to bemeasured as
deviations from their means. In this formulation, u,.capturesthe net
influence of two unobservables on hourly earnings: unobservedjob quality and
unobserved match quality. A. is assumed to be fixed over an individual's
lifetime and u. .isassumed to be fixed over the course of a job. A.may be 1J 1
correlated with S; u. may be correlated with both S and EX?. A. andii. .are 1J 1 1J4
assumed to be orthogonal to one another, and the error is assumed to be
orthogonal to 5, EXP, A and
In equation (1), 2 represents the returns to experience due to
accumulation of general human capital or simply to the passage of time in the
labor market. Earnings are also likely to grow with experience because more
experienced workers, having had more chances to search for and sample labor
market opportunities, typically end up in better jobs and/or bettermatches.4




whereAlandEXP are as previously defined, u is a parameter that summarizes
the relationship between u and EXP, and •. .isthe variation in u not
13
systematicallyrelated to EXP. Substituting into equation (1) yields:
(3)lnw. =5..+(-f-u)EXP. .+&A.+•.+fl. ijt 1ijt 2 13 1 1Jijt
where.isthe total return to seniority and +uis the total return to
pre—job experience. The net return to seniority is appropriately defined as
the excess of growth in earnings on a given job over and above the total
returns to general labor market experience, or — +c).
In practice, earnings functions are usually estimated using cross—
section data where neither A nor are observable. The earnings function
as ordinarily implemented in a cross—section can be rewritten as:
(4)lnW.. =bS.. +bEXP.. +v..
ijt 1ijt 2 13ijt
where is the estimating equation error. Note that both the person—
specific component of the error (BA.) and the job/match specific component of
the error (,..)areomitted from the equation.
3. This model is a generalization of the model presented in Abraham and
Farber (1987)
4. See and Topel (1985) and Abraham and Farber (1987).5
How does omitting these person and job/match errorcomponents from the
earnings equation affect the estimated value of the net return toseniority,
— +a)?Toanswer this question, we need to impose more structure on
the interrelationships among seniority, experience, job duration, A. andii...
Suppose that the completed duration of jobs is positively related to both A.
and ii.. and that the following relationship holds:
(5)
1 i 2 ij ij
where D. .isthe completed length of the current job, A. and u. areas 1) 1 1J
defined above, and the 's are parameters that summarize therelationships of
D with A and Li.The parameter 2. will be positive to the extent that more
able workers are on longer duration jobs, and the parameter will be
positive to the extent that workers in "good" jobs or good matches areon
longer duration jobs. The random component, E.., captures the variation in
completed job duration that cannot be linked to variation in worker quality or
to variation in the earnings advantage associated with job/match quality.5
Substituting from equation (2),
(6) D. .= A.+ oEXP..+'. . +E.
1J J. 1 2 ij 2 ij ij
Holding initial experience constant, completed job duration is positively
related to both A. and *.
2. 1J
If each year of any given job is equally likely to be represented ina
cross—section of observations, then on average the observed seniority on the
job will be halfway through the job. More formally
(7) E(S. .) = 1/2*D.
ijt 1J
and
(8) S. .= 1/2*D..+.. ljt 1J ljt
5. It should be emphasized that neither equation (4) nor equation (5) is
a structural equation. Both are intended simply to summarize relationships
expected in cross—section data.6
where .isa random variable with zero mean. The distribution of .will
ijt ijt
vary depending upon the completed length of the job, but ijt is uncorrelated
with u, .,withD. and with EXP.
1J 1J 1J
Using these relationships, it is straightforward to show that
(9) E(b) =A1+ (1/2)*var(EXP.)*
[8**var (A.) +2 var (,..))* (1/DE'1'1)
and that
(10) E(b2) = +oc)— bExp *
(1/2)*var(EXP)*
[&**var (At) +2*var (.) )* (1/DET1)
where bEXpis the coefficient obtained from a regression of EXP on S (which
is expected to be positive), DET1 is the determinant of the X'X matrix
containing cross—products of seniority and experience, and the other terms are
as previously defined. Thus, the estimated total return to seniority is
biased upwards and the estimated total return to experience is correspondingly
biased downwards. Both the upward bias in the estimated total return to
seniority and the downward bias in the estimated total return to experience
contribute to an upward bias in the estimated net return to seniority, b1 —
b2.
The formal model, and in particular equations (9) and (10), highlight
several factors that may contribute to greater upward bias in the estimated
return to seniority, other things equal. First, assuming that is positive,
the bias will be larger where the variance in unobserved ability (var(A)) is
larger. Second, again assuming that is positive, the bias will be larger
where the reward to unobserved ability (&) is larger. Third, the bias will be
larger where the variance in the job/match component of earnings that is not
systematically related to pre—job experience (var(...)) is larger. Note that
(11) var(.. .)= var(ji..)- oc2*var(EXP..).
1J 1J 1J7
If cc2*var(EXp..) is similar across two samples, then thedifference in the
variance of • across the samples will be approximatelyequal to the difference
in the variance of ji.
I'•
Available evidence pertaining to returns to ability,heterogeneity in
ability, and heterogeneity in the job/match component ofearnings among union
versus nonunion workers provides grounds for believing that the union
seniority coefficient is less seriously upward biased than the nonunion
seniority coefficient.
First, it is likely that the rewards to unobserved abilityare lower in
the union sector than in the nonunion sector. Numerousobservers have noted
the importance of single/standard rate policies and automaticprogression
policies in union wage setting (for example, the Vebbs, l92O andSlichter,
Healy and Livernash, 1960). Using data from the Industry WageSurveys carried
out by the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS), Freeman (1982) documentsthat
within—establishment wage dispersion is lower in the unionsegment than in the
nonunion segment of the industries for which dataare available. He also
notes that explicit single rate and automatic progressionpolicies account for
much of this difference in wage dispersion for unionas compared to nonunion
establishments. Such policies leave little room to reward differencesin
workers' ability. Numerous other studies (e.g., Bloch andKuskin, 1976;
Lewis, 1986) using data on individuals have established that skill
differentials and educational d.ifferentials inwages are lower among unionized
workers than among nonunion workers. While these studiespertain only
indirectly to the rewards to unobservable differences inability, they suggest
strongly that the rewards ()associatedwith these differences are lower
among union workers. To the extent that this is true, the bias in estimated8
seniority coefficients will be less for samples of union workers.
Next, it is plausible that there is less heterogeneity in ability among
union workers than among nonunion workers. Abowd and Farber (1982) andFarber
(1983) develop and test a queuing model of union status determination. They
hypothesize that "more skilled workers would be less likely todesire a union
job while union employers would be more likely to want tohire more skilled
workers" (Abowd and Farber, 1982, p. 367), and their empirical findings are
generally supportive of the model. To the extent that unobserved abilityis
an important factor in both worker selection and employerselection, the
dispersion of ability among union workers will be lower than the dispersionof
ability among nonunion workers. Assuming that more able workers arealso more
stable, lower dispersion in ability (var(A1)) for union workers means less
upward bias in estimated seniority coefficients for samples ofunion workers.
Finally, there is reason to suspect that the variation in the job/match
component of earnings will be lower across union jobs than acrossnonunion
jobs. Institutional labor economists have long recognized thatunions strive
to standardize rates across establishments, at least within broad sectors(see
Slichter, Healy and Livernash (1960)). Freeman (1982) offers evidence that
dispersion in average wages across union establishments in an industrydoes
tend to be lower than the dispersion in wages across nonunion establishments
in the same industry. In addition, the same forces limiting employers' power
to reward higher ability workers would also limit their power to pay higher
wages to workers who are especially well suited to a particularjob, thereby
reducing the importance of match—specific (as opposed to job—specific)
effects. To the extent that the variation in that part of the job/match
component of earnings not systematically related to experience (var(..))is
lower across union jobs than across nonunion jobs, this too will contribute to
lower bias in the estimated return to seniority in cross—section earnings9
equations fit for samples of union workers.
Further evidence concordant with the abovehypotheses is provided by the
various studies which conclude that thedispersion of wages is lower in the
union sector than in the nonunionsector, even after controlling for the
influence of observable individual characteristics.6
These arguments for why we mightexpect less bias in the estimated
return to seniority for union workers than fornonunion workers assume that
other things are equal across the twosectors. We have no a iori reason to
expect that var(EXP), or the ratio of var(EXP) toDET1 should
differ systematically between the union andthe nonunion sectors. We cannot
simply compute the relative biases in the estimatednet returns to seniority
in union and nonunion earnings functionsusing equations (9) and (10) since
much of the information on unobservables thatwould be needed is unavailable.
However, we have developed methods for computingcorrected estimates of the
seniority coefficients in cross—section earningsequations.
IV.CorrectedCross-section Estimatesofthe Returnto Seniority
Oneapproach to correcting the equation (4) estimates of thereturns to
seniority and to experience is to find an appropriate instrumentfor the
seniority variable. Equation (8) suggests a suitableinstrument:ijt' which
equals S.—1/2*D,..Byconstruction, .iscorrelated with seniority but ijt ijt
uncorrelated with completed duration and thenceuncorrelated with the omitted
individual and job/match components in theearnings equation. The
instrumental variables estimator ofb1 is a consistent estimator of and the
instrumental variables estimator ofb2 is a consistent estimator of+ .
6.These studies include Hyclak (1979), Freeman(1980) and Hirsch (1982).10
The preceding assumes that the expected value of current seniority in a
cross—section is indeed just equal to half completed job duration. This
assumption is stronger than necessary and may not be precisely correct. For
example, in a growing population, there will likely be more people near the
start of their jobs than near the end. More generally, using the residual
from the regression of seniority on completed job duration as an instrument
for seniority yields consistent estimates of and 2 +.Byconstruction,
this residual is uncorrelated with completed duration and correlated with
7
seniority.
An appealing alternative approach to correcting the bias in the
estimated seniority coefficient in a cross—section earnings equation is to
control explicitly for the completed length of the job. We term this the
"augmented OLS" approach. The seniority coefficient in equation (4) is upward
biased only because both A. and are related to how long a job ends up
lasting, and workers in jobs that end up lasting a long time tend to have
higher current seniority when we observe them in a cross—section. Augmenting
equation (4) by adding D.. as an explanatory variable yields the following
specification:
(12) mW.. =bS.. +bEXP.. +bD.. +.. ijt 1ijt 2j 3ijijt
Theseniority coefficient in equation (12), b,, is an unbiased estimator of





wherehEX? D j5 the coefficient obtained from a regressionof EXP on D (which
7. For more details in the context of a simpler model, see Abraham and
Farber (1987). Altonji and Shakotko (1987) present a related instrumental
variables approach to estimating the returns to seniority.11
expected to be positive),DET2 equals the determinant of the 2x2 matrix
containing cross—products of EXP and D, and the otherterms are as previously
defined. So long as workers with morepre—job experience tend to stay longer
in their positions,b2 is a downward biased estimate of +. This,in
turn, implies that b1b2 is an upward biased estimate of the net return to
seniority.8 The augmented OLSprocedure has the advantage that it permits
direct examination of the relationship betweencompleted job duration and
earnings, both on average and over the course of thejob.
Using the identity that links total experience withpre—job experience
and seniority (EX?..t =EXP..+S..t)and ignoring second order terms, valid
inferences regarding the net return toseniority can be drawn from an earnings
function specification that includes eitherpre—job experience or total
experience along with seniority. Wherepre—job experience is used, the net
return to seniority (—+))is calculated as the difference between the
coefficient on seniority and the coefficienton pre—job experience. Where
total experience is used, the net return toseniority is simply the
coefficient on seniority. To facilitate discussionregarding the net return
to seniority, we proceed from hereusing total experience.9
In the empirical analysis that follows,we develop a measure of
completed job duration using longitudinal data anduse this measure in the two
8. In the samples we examine, the instrumentalvariables procedure and
the alternative procedure of addingcompleted job duration to the earnings
equation yield almost identical estimates of thenet return to seniority.
This implies that, in these samples, the biasin the estimated total return to
experience and the resulting bias in the estimatednet return to seniority are
quite small. See Section VI.
9. For the instrumental variablesestimator, this requires the minor
modification that total experience (and itssquare, if included) must be
instrumented for along with seniority. Thenatural additional instruments are
pre—job experience (and its square). In a modelwithout squared terms, the IV
estimator of the specification using pre—jobexperience and the IV estimator
using total experience with pre—job experienceas an additional instrument
yield identical estimates of the underlyingparameters.12
ways just described to estimate "corrected" earningsfunctions for samples of
union and nonunion blue collar workers.
V.
Thefirst step in implementing the analysis just described is to derive
a measure of completed job duration. Clearly, adata set suitable for this
task must follow individual workers over time so that one can observehow long
the jobs they hold ultimately last. The data set should also haveinformation
on the individual workers' characteristics, includingtheir union status, and
their wages/earnings. The ?Iichigan Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID)
satisfies these requirements and is used in the empirical analysis.
Unfortunately, even in a long panel like the PSID, there are many jobswhich
do not end by the date at which the individual is last observed. Some
procedure must be used to impute completed durations to these jobs.
We take the approach of estimating a parametric model of jobduration
that accounts for the censoring of duration in those jobs for whichthe end is
not observed. This model is then used to compute an estimateof the expected
completed job duration conditiona on the job lasting, at least as long asthe
last observed seniority level. In the estimation of the earnings function,
this estimate is used as the measure of completed job duration for the
censored spells. The actual completed job duration is used for jobs forwhich
the end is observed. This procedure has the advantage of using all available
information on job duration.
A. The JobsSample
Allof the subsequent analysis is performed using data for male
10
househola heads agea 18 to 60 who participated in the PSID. We used only
10. Unfortunately, the design of the PSID precludes meaningful examination13
observations from the random national sampleportion of the PSID (the so—
called Survey Research Center or SRCsubsample). Persons who were retired,
permanently disabled, self—employed, employed by thegovernment or residents
of Alaska or Hawaii were excluded from thesample. Because we were concerned
that different processes mightgovern seniority attainment and earnings in
different broad occupationalgroups, we look exclusively at samples of blue
collar workers.1' In what follows, we centerour discussion on results for
two samples of workers: unionized blue collarworkers and nonunionjzed blue
collar workers.12 In order to be clear in theidentification of union and
nonunion jobs, observations on jobs for which theworker changed union status
during the course of the job do not appear in either sample.13In each year
from 1968 through 1980 in which those individualssatisfying our selection
criteria were household heads, informationwas available on number of years
they had held their current job, number ofyears they had worked prior to
taking the current job, years of education,race, marital status, disability
status, occupation, industry, region and earnings.14
of females for the purposes of this study. This isbecause complete
information is available only for householdheads, and, where households
contain both male and female adults, the male isassumed to be the head by
default.
11. There were not enough white collar unionizedworkers to permit a
meaningful analysis of white collar workers.
12. In some years unionization refers to unionmembership, and in other
years to coverage by a collective bargaining agreement. Whereboth were
available, collective bargaining agreementcoverage was used.
13. In 371 jobs workers were coded nonunion insome years and union in
others. If 1) at least two thirds of the observedyears on one of these jobs
were coded nonunion, 2) there were no runs of threeor more years coded union,
and 3) the first and last years observedon the job were coded nonunion, then
the entire job was considered a nonunion job andwas included in the nonunion
sample. An analogous decision rule lead to the assignmentof some mixed jobs
to the union sample. A total of 149 jobs couldnot be assigned to either
group and were deleted altogether.
14.Noredetails on the data file used intheanalysis, and in particular
on the construction of the seniority variable, can be found inAbraham and
Farber (1987). We are grateful to Joe Altonji formaking his data extract
from the PSID available to us.14
There are 767 jobs held by 551 individuals representedin the union blue
collar sample and 1417 jobs held by 831 individualsrepresented in the
noflUfliOfl blue collar sample. Our concern at this pointis with ascertaining
how long each of these jobs ultimately lasted.
Various characteristics of the jobs in each of the two samplesare
reported in Table 1. Variables that can change overtime in an unpredictable
fashion (e.g., marital status, occupation) are assumedconstant and measured
at the first point the job is observed in the sample.The last observed
seniority on a job is always considered to be theseniority at the last date
the person is observed with an employer, whether or notthe individual is
15
still in a blue collar position at that date.
In the union blue collar sample, we observe theactual completed
duration for 327 of 767 jobs, and in the nonunion bluecollar sample, for 775
of 1417 jobs. Not surprisingly, a large proportionof the completed jobs are
relatively short: 71 percent of the completed jobsin the union blue collar
sample and 85 percent of those in the nonunionblue collar sample lasted no
more than three years. However, in both samples,there are a sizable number
of completed jobs lasting 3 to 10 years and over 10 years. Longerjobs are
more common among the still—in—progress jobs:28 percent of the incomplete
jobs in the union blue collar sample and 22 percentof the incomplete jobs in
the nonunion blue collar sample had lasted more than 10 years asof the last
date they were observed.
15. For example, if an individual 1) was observed on a single jobfor ten
years running 2) reported being a bluecollar worker for the first five years
and a professional employee for the next five years; and 3) reportedhaving 13
years seniority in the last observed year,then the job would appear in our
sample with a last observed seniority of 13 years.Table 1:







T 1 .526 .166 .639 .294
1T 3 .180 .143 .215 .213 3 <T 10 .211 .318 .115 .268 T >10 .0826 .373 .0310 .224
deviatjoril of:
Years of tenure 3.3 10.1 1.9 6.7
at lastdate [4.9] [9.4] [3.2] [8.1] jobobserved
RYears of pre—job 10.7 11.0 9.8 11.8 experience [9.3] [9.7] [9.0] [10.0]
(Years pre—ob 202.0 214.2 175.7 238.5
experience) [322.8][347.1] [325.1] [372.0]
Years of 11.3 11.3 11.4 11.3
education [2.5] [2.2] [2.3] [2.6]
Proption:
Nonwhite .104 .136 .139 .137
Married .890 .898 .823 .872
Disabled .092 .068 .076 .114
Foreman, craft .355 .430 .421 .461
Oper,labor .645 .570 .579 .539
Number of 327 440 775 642
obs ervat ions
aExcept for tenure andyears of previous experience, all variables are
reported as of the first year the job was observed. Previousexperience was
computed as the difference between reported experience in the firstyear the
job was observed and seniority at that point.15
B. SpecifiCapJ24i
Inorder to use completed job duration as an earnings equation control
variable, we need a method of determining the expected completedduration of
the incomplete jobs. We specify and estimate a parametricmodel of completed
job duration for each sector, and. then we use theestimated parameters to
predict the expected completed length of jobs still in progress asof the last
date we observe them.
The proportional hazard Weibull specification serves as the basisof the
estimation reported here. In that specification, the probability that a job
has completed duration (D) greater than or equal to T is
(14)Pr(D￿T) =exp[xTU]
whereis a positive parameter. The proportional hazard assumptionis that
the baseline hazard is
—z.
(15)x=e
where Z is a vector of observable individual characteristics hypothesizedto
affect job duration and 'isa vector of parameters. The separation hazard
associated with this distribution is:
(16) H(t) =
Ifthe parameters of a Weibull duration model are estimated, there is
some ambiguity in the interpretation of the estimateof u.Theobvious
interpretation is that the estimated value ofindicates "true" duration
dependence. An alternative interpretation is that theestimate ofis biased
downward by unmeasured heterogeneity across individuals, jobs and/ormatches.
For the purposes of this study, we are not interested in distinguishing
between true and spurious duration dependence. We are simplyinterested in
estimating a parametric model of completed job duration that isflexible
enough to make allowance for both true duration dependence andunmeasured
heterogeneity in hazards. While we could specify a particulardistribution16
for the unobserved heterogeneity in thehazard along with the Weibull form of
duration dependence, it is well known thatthere are problems with robustness
of the estimates of heterogeneity and duration
dependence with regard to
changes in the assumed distributions in models ofthis sort.16 We take the
approach of estimating a simple Veibull model ofcompleted job duration
without any explicit representation forunmeasured heterogeneity.
The contribution to the likelihood functionmade by a completed job is
the Probability—density that the job lastedexactly Sf years given that the
job lasted at leastS0 years.'7 Given a Weibull distribution for duration,
this is
(17) Pr(D=SfID>S0) =
Similarly,the contribution to the likelihood functionmade by a job with a
censored duration is the probability that thejob lasted more_thanSf years
given that the job lasted at leastS0 years. This is
(18)Pr(D￿SfID>50) =expt—>(S—s)].
The log—likeljho function is formed fromthese probabilities as
(19) ln(L) =EC.lnpr(D￿S.ID.>S .) +
3 3 3fjj Oj
(1—C.)lnpr(D.=5 .ID.>S .)}
J jfj j Oj
where j indexes jobs and C. is an indicatorvariable that equals one if the
completed job duration is censored and equalszero otherwise.18
16. See Lancaster (1979) for a parametricapproach to the problem of
estimating unmeasured heterogeneity in a WeibulJ. modelof unemployment
duration. Heckman and Singer (1984)present a semi—parametric approach to
estimating duration models with unmeasuredheterogeneity.
17. It is important to conditionon the length of the job as of the date
it is first observed because thesampling scheme is such that jobs will not be
observed unless they last long enough to makeit to the start of the sample
period.
18. Note that this specification of thelikelihood function assumes that
unmeasured factors affecting completed job durationsare independent across spells. A more complete specification wouldrecognize that we observe some
people on more than one job and allowexplicitly for individual heterogeneity
in job changing propensity. Given thenonlinear nature of the model, we saw17
C. Estimation of the Job Duration Model
Column 1 and column 2 of Table 2 contain estimates of the Weibull job
duration model estimated over the subsamples of 767 union blue collar jobsand
1417 nonunion blue collar jobs, respectively. These estimates werederived by
maximizing the likelihood function defined above with respect tothe
parametersand In interpreting the estimates of the determinants of
the baseline hazard (k),recallthat the hazard rate was specified such that
Thus, an increase in a variable with a positive coefficient reduces x
and increases the expected duration of the job. In both models the hypothesis
that the all of the coefficients () in the baseline hazard (x) withthe
exception of the constant are zero can be rejected at any reasonablelevel of
significance.2° Thus, the variables included in the model have significant
explanatory power for job duration.
The two sets of estimates are generally similar. In both the unionand
the nonunion sample, years of experience prior to taking a job has a positive
effect on the completed duration of the job. Married workers' jobs tend to
last longer than those of otherwise similar workers. Education raises
predicted job duration for the nonunion sample, but has no statistically
significant effect on job duration for the union sample. Being a foreman or
craft worker has a stronger effect on the duration of union jobs than on the
duration of nonunion jobs.
no obvious appropriate and tractable way to do this.
19. The algorithm described by Berndt, Hall, Hall, and Hausman (1974) was
used to find the maximum.
20. The likeihood ratio statistic is 81.2 for the union model. This is
distributed as x with 21 degrees of freedom. The likelih9od ratio statistic
is 104.8 for the nonunion model. This is distributed as x with 22 degrees of
freedom.Table 2:






Yearsof experience .0407 .0611
(.0185) (.0100)
(Years of experience)2 —.00068 —.00113
(.00054) (.00027)
Years of education .00235 .0243
(.02366) (.0136)
Nonwhite (yes =1) .178 —.0387
(.171) (.0878)
Married (yes =1) .271 .464
(.161) (.0730)
Disabled (yes =1) —.512 .180
(.174) (.113)







Sample size 767 1417
aTh coefficient estimates are from a Weibullproportional hazards model
implemented using the jobs samples describedin Table 1. All explanatory
variables are reported as of the start ofthe job. Operatives/laborers are the omitted occupationalgroup. The models also include industry and region
controls. The numbers in parenthesesare asymptotic standard errors.18
D.Prediction_pbDur ation for Incomlet e Jobs
Weused the parameter estimates from the appropriate column of Table2
to predict the expected completed job duration of eachof the incomplete jobs
in the two san'iples.21 This expectation is computed conditionally onthe job
lasting longer than the last observed seniority (Sf years). Notethat the job
duration model we have estimated is based on data for the pre—retirement
period. It will capture the net effects of quit and layoff processeson job
duration, but will not capture the effect of the competing retirement process
which comes into play for older workers. If we predicted jobdurations
without taking retirement into account, some would be implausibly long.We
therefore assume that all jobs that are in progress when the workerreaches
age 65 end at that point.
For an individual/job match with observable characteristicsZ that has
lasted Sf years as of the last date we observe it, the conditional expected











Allpredictions use the parameter estimates contained in Table 2.The
conditional expectation of the square of completed job duration was computed
in a similar manner.
21. Recall that the actual completed job duration is used for the
completed jobs.19
Many of the union blue collar jobs were quite long of the 767completed
and incomplete jobs represented in thesample, 22 percent were predicted to
have completed durations of 1year or less, 9 percent to have completed
durations of 1 to 3 years, 17 percent to havecompleted durations of 3 to 10
years and 51 percent to have completed durations of more thanten years. More
of the nonunion blue collar jobswere relatively short of the 1417 completed
and incomplete jobs represented in the sample, 35percent were predicted to
have completed durations of 1 year or less, 16percent to have completed
durations of 1 to 3 years, 25 percent to havecompleted durations of 3 to 10
years, and 24 percent to have completed durations of more than tenyears.
VI. Earnings Function Estimates
Having derived an estimate of completed job duration we turnnow to the
question of the relative magnitude of the net returns toseniority in union
and nonunion jobs.
Our starting point is to fit standard earnings functions ofthe form
(22) ln(V.) =e+eS. +eE. +eE. +X,+ E. ijt 0 1 ijt 2ijt 3ijtijtljt
whereln(W) is the logarithm of real average hourly earnings,
5ijt is
seniority, E. is total experience, X. is a vector of other individual ijt ijt
characteristics,and Ejit represents unmeasured factors affectingearnings.
The coefficient is the net return to seniority and corresponds to —
inthe model of Section II. These earnings functionsare fit using the
individual—year observations from the two jobs samples discussed inSection
III. There are 3084 individual—year observations for workersin union blue
collar jobs and 3554 individual—year observations for workersin nonunion blue
collar jobs.
The first columns of tables 3a and 3b contain estimates of20
selected parameters of standard earningsfunctions.22 Each equation also
includes controls for education, race, marital status, disability, occupation,
industry, region, and time. These estimates imply that the returnsto
seniority are larger for the nonunion blue collar sample than for theunion
blue collar sample. Among union workers, each additional year of seniorityis
associated with roughly a 1.0 percent increment to earnings; among nonunion
workers, each additional year of seniority is associated with earnings that
are 1.4 percent higher. The difference between the twoestimated seniority
coefficients is significant at better than the 0.01 level.
The instrumental variables estimates in the tables' second columns tell
a very different story. In these equations, the residualfrom the regression
of seniority on completed job duration is used as an instrument for seniority,
and pre—job experience and its square are used as instruments for total
experience and its square.23 The estimated return to seniority for theunion
sample falls only slightly, from 1.0 percent per year to just over 0.7 percent
per year. The decline in the estimated return to seniorityis much larger for
the nonunion sample, a drop of more than a full percentage point from 1.4
percent to 0.3 percent per year, and the corrected estimate is not
significantly different from zero. In contrast to the standard equations,
these equations imply that the return to seniority for union blue collar
22. The stadard erors presented are the "simp1e standrd errors
computed from a (X'X)for the OLS models and from (Z'X) for the IV
models. These standard errors are not strictly appropriate for the estimation
here because they do not account for the fact that the measure of completed
job duration is predicted for the observations on censored jobs. Standard
errors that are corrected both for this fact and for general
heteroskedasticity were computed for a number of specifications. These were
uniformly very close to the "simple" standard errors.
23. in the regression of seniority on completed job duration fit for the
union sample, the constant term is —1.990 (standard error 0.206) and the job
duration coefficient is 0.500 (0.008). Inthenonunion equation, the constant
term is —1.313 (0.097) and the job duration coefficient is 0.550 (0.005).Table 3a:
Selected Coefficients from ln(average hourly earnings) Modelsa
Union Blue Collar Sample
Mean OLS IV OLS OIJS
________Js..L_____ IJ2L_(3) (41_
Years of 19.81 .0141 .00782 .0107 .00983
experience [11.05] (.0022) (.00534) (.0023) (.00253)
(Years of
2 514.67 —.00024 —.00011 —.00017—.00017
experience) [481.94] (.00005) (.00012) (.00005)(.00005)
Years of current 9.39 .00975 .00748 .00792 .0117
seniority [8.48] (.00084) (.00098) (.00138)(.0020)
E(completed job 22.75 .0105 .0224
duration) [12.75] (.0019)(.0042)
E[(comp1ete job 739.07 —.00018 —.00051
duration] [574.10] (.00005) (.00012)
E(job duration)*[=1 7.05 —.00707 if 3 <seniority 10] [11.36] (.00358)
[E(job duration)]2*[=1 205.51 .00018 if 3 < seniority10] [377.97] (.00012)
E(job duration)*[=1 12.04 ——— —.0163
if seniority >10] [16.85] (.0038)
[E(job duration)]2*[=1 439.65 .00041
if seniority > 10] [658.23] (.00012)
.291 .284 .299 .305
aAll models also include controls foreducation, race, marital status,
disability, occupation, industry, region, and time. E(completed jobduration)
is computed using the relevant estimates from Table 2. TheIV estimates use
1) the residual from the regression of seniority on completedjob duration, 2)
pre—job experience, and 3) the square of pre—job experience as instrumentsfor
seniority, experience, and the square of experience. The numbers in
parentheses are standard errors. Sample size =3084.Table 3b:
Selected Coefficients from ln(average hourly earnings) Modelsa
Nonunion Blue Collar Sample
Mean OLS IV OLS OLS
(1) IL
Years of 17.34 .0205 .0173 .0117 .0120
experience [11.14] (.0024) (.0040) (.0026) (.0026)
(Years of
2
424.70 —.00045 —.00042 —.00026—.00028
experience) [470.81] (.00006) (.00009) (.00006)(.00006)
Years of current 6.31 .0142 .00290 .00241—.00054
seniority [7.46] (.0011) (.00172) (.00213)(.00302)
E(completed job 13.86 .0154 .0381
duration) [11.75] (.0021)(.0057)
E[(complete job 362.44 —.00014 —.00104
duration] [444.45] (.00006) (.00024)
E(job duration)*[=1 4.57 ——— —.00592
if 3 <seniorityc 10] [8.27] (.00538)
[E(job duration)]2*[=1 102.13 .00031
if 3 <seniorityc 10] [211.7] (.00024)
E(job duration)*[=1 6.45 —.0241
if seniority > 10] [12.90] (.0055)
[E(job duration)]2*[=1 215.1 .00103
if seniority >10] [461.9] (.00024)
.388 .351 .404 .410
aAll models also include controls for education, race, marital status,
disability, occupation, industry, region, and time. E(completed job duration)
is computed using the relevant estimates from Table 2. The IV estimates use
1) the residual from the regression of seniority on completed job duration, 2)
pre—job experience, and 3) the square of pre—job experience as instruments for
seniority, experience, and the square of experience. The numbers in
parentheses are standard errors. Sample size =3554.21
workers is larger than the return for nonunion bluecollar workers, a
difference that is significant at better thanthe 0.01 level.
As discussed earlier, an alternative estimateof the net return to
seniority can be obtained by adding completed job durationto the standard
earnings function. This is done in the column (3)models of tables 3a and 3b.
The returns to seniority estimatedusing this alternative approach are
virtually identical to those obtained using the IVapproach. While the
theoretical discussion in Section II implied thatthe augmented OLS estimates
of the return to seniority reported in column(3) may be upward biased, the
close correspondence between the IV andaugmented OLS estimates indicates that
any such bias is small.24
These findings are in accord with some scatteredearlier results.
Mincer (1983) finds that controlling forprior nobility reduces the estimated
return to seniority for nonunion workers, but not forunion workers. Altonji
and Shakotko (1987) use an instrumental variablesapproach to dealing with the
bias in estimated returns to seniority. Whileunion/nonunion differences are
not a central focus of their study, they doreport that their correction
procedure reduces the estimated return to senioritymore dramatically for
nonunion workers than for union workers.
The other interesting implication of the column(3) estimates is that,
in both samples, those on long jobsearn substantially and significantly more
than those on short jobs. Among union bluecollar workers, someone on a job
that will end up lasting twentyyears earns 9.0 percent more in each year on
the job than someone on a job that will endup lasting only five years. Among
nonunion blue collar workers, someone on atwenty year job earns approximately
24. In fact, in the nonunion sample, theaugmented OLS estimate is
slightly, though not significantly, smaller than the IVestimate.22
18 percent more in each year on the job than someone on a five year job.
In the column (4) models, we allow the effects of completed job duration
to vary with current seniority. The results confirm that those on long jobs
earn more at all points on the job, although the effect seems tobe strongest
at the start of the job and somewhat weaker later on.
The column (4) results contradict one possible alternative
interpretation of our central finding that, when completed job duration is
introduced into the earnings equation, it takes on a positive coefficient and
the estimated return to seniority falls. Specifically, it might be argued
that the returns to seniority are higher on long jobs than on short jobs and
that, because we do not allow for this possibility, completed job duration
enters with a positive coefficient and soaks up some of what are in fact
returns to seniority. If this interpretation were correct, when we allowed
the effects of completed job duration to vary with current seniority, we
should find that eventual completed job duration is only weakly associated
with earnings among workers with lower levels of seniority, and more strongly
associated with earnings among workers with higher levels of seniority. In
fact, the opposite appears to be true.
Probably the most important question to be raised about the preceding
analysis is whether we have done a sufficiently good job of measuring
completed job duration. Using expected completed job duration in place of
actual completed job duration does not cause inconsistency in the earnings
equation parameter estimates, provided the correct job duration model has been
used in computing completed job duration. However, if the job duration model
itself is misspecified and this leads to random errors in the expected
completed job duration variable, both the instrumental variables estimate and23
the augmented OLS estimate of the return toseniority are biased upwards.25
In the present context, if we have done a lessgood job of predicting expected
completed job duration for the union blue collar sample thanfor the nonunion
blue collar sample, this could at least inpart account for the higher
estimated return to seniority for union workers thanfor nonunion workers in
the IV and augmented OLS equations.
In light of this concern, we have madean effort to assess the method
used to compute completed job durations for thecensored jobs. Since our
measure of completed job duration for censored jobs isreally a nonlinear
transformation of the sorts of variables already includedin the earnings
function plus the last observed value ofseniority, an obvious question is
whether our measure completed job duration containsinformation beyond that
contained in last observed seniority itself. The modelsin the first three
columns of tables 4a and 4b indicate that, for boththe union and the nonunion
samples, this question can be answered "yes". Forcomparison, column (1)
repeats the augmented OLS euatjon that includes completedjob duration and
its square. In column (2), last observedseniority and its square replace
completed job duration. The column (3) models include bothcompleted job
duration and last observed seniority. In bothsamples, comparison of column
(2) and column (3) reveals that the inclusion ofcompleted job duration and
25. Taking the instrumental variablesapproach, the instrument for
seniority is constructed as the residual from theregression of seniority on
expected completed job duration. If there are randomerrors in the expected
completed job duration variable, its coefficient in thisregression will be
biased downward. This means that theconstructed residual will be positively
correlated with actual completed job duration and thencewith omitted
individual or job/match quality. Using this residualas an instrument for
seniority in the earnings equation yields an upward biasedestimate of the
return to seniority. In the augmented OLSearnings equation, random errors in
the expected completed job duration variablecause the job duration
coefficient to be biased towards zero and the estimatednet return to
seniority to be biased upwards.Table 4a:
Selected Coefficients from ln (average houriX earnings) Models
Union Blue Collar Sample
Alternative Models
Mean OLS OLS OLS OLS
ti (1) (2) (3) (4)




experience) [481.94](.00005) (.00005) (.00005)(.00005)
Years of current 9.39 .00792 —.00251 —.00104 .00371
seniority [8.48](.00138) (.00257) (.00287)(.00183)
E(completed job 22.75 .0105 ——— .00701 .00950
duration) [12.75] (0019) (.00329)(.00284)
E(completed jb 739.07 —.00018 ——— —.00017—.00009
duration)1 [574.10] (.00005) (.00007)(.00005)
Years Last Observed 12.86 ——— .0176 .0120
Seniority [9.53] (.0027)) (.0050)
Years Last Oserved 256.15 ——— —.00018—.00001
Seniorityl [316.41] (.00006) (.00009)
E(job duration)*[1 1.53 .01409
if uncensored] [4.243 (.00482)
{E(job duration)}2* 20.35 ——— —.00043
[=1 if uncensored] [80.99] (.00022)
.299 .301 .302 .302
aAll models also include controls for education, race, marital status,
disability, occupation, industry, region, and year. E(completed job duration)
is computed using the estimates in column (1) of table 2. The numbers in
parentheses are standard errors. Sample size=3084.Table 4b:
Selected Coefficients from in (average hourlyprnings) Models
Nonunion Blue Collar Sample
Alternative Models
Mean OLS OI.IS OLS OLS
fs.d.](1) (2) (3) (4)
Years of 17.34 .0117 .0135 .0118 .0119
experience [11.14](.0026)(.00256)(.00259) (.0027)
(Years of
2 424.70—.00026 —.00028—.00026 —.00027
experience) [470.81](.00006) (.00006) (.00006) (.00006)
Years of current 6.31 .00241 —.00304 .00375 .00412
seniority [7.46](.00213) (.00322)(.00352) (.00307)
E(completed job 13.86 .0154 .0175 .0167
duration) [11.75](.0021) (.0052)(.0022)
{E(completed jb 362.44—.00014 —.00017 —.00020
durationfl [444.45](.00006) (.00012) (.00008)
Years Last Observed 8.80 ——— .0255 —.00377
Seniority [8.82] (.0031) (.00730)
(Years Last 9bserved 155.2 ——— —.00031 .00005
Seniorityj [263.8] (.00008)(.00017)
E(job duration)*[=1 1.29 .00556
if uncensored] [3.39] (.00627)
{E(job duration)J2* 13.18 --- -.00053
[=1 if uncensored] [60.21] (.00030)
R2 .4041 .4001 .4042 .4051
aAll models also include controls foreducation, race, marital status,
disability, occupation, industry, region, and year. E(completed job duration)
is computed using the estimates in column (2) of table 2. The numbers in
parentheses are standard errors. Sample size=3554.24
its square adds significantly to the model's explanatory power at the 0.05
level or better, even after controlling for last observed seniority. The
major difference between the two samples is that last observed seniority adds
significantly to the explanatory power of the union model even after completed
job duration has been controlled for, whereas it does not add significantly to
the explanatory power of the nonunionmodel.26We have no explanation for
why last observed seniority should have an independent association with
earnings in the union sector.
Another obvious question concerning our completed job duration variable
is whether the relationship between completed job duration and earnings
differs between the observations that come from jobs where actual completed
durations are observed and from jobs where completed durations are predicted.
To answer this question, we reestirnated the augmented OLS earnings functions
with two additional variables: the interaction between completed job duration
with a dummy variable that equals one if the job duration is uncensored and
equals zero otherwise, and the interaction of the square of completed job
duration with the same dummy variable. These estimates are contained in
column (4) of tables 4a and 4b. In the union sample, these interaction terms
add significantly to the explanatory power of the model; in the nonunion
26. This is verified by F—tests of the general specification in column
(3) against the restricted specifications in column (1) and column (2). The
test statistics for the hypothesis that completed job duration and its square
have zero coefficients are 3.27 for union blue collar workers and 12.1 for
nonunion blue collar workers. The test statistics for the hypothesis that
last observed seniority and its square have zero coefficients are 6.22 for
union blue collar workers and 0.295 for nonunion blue collar workers. All the
test statistics are distributed as F with 2 and approximately 3000 degrees of
freedom. The critical values of this distribution are 3.00 at the 5 percent
level and 4.61 at the 1 percent level.25
sample, they do not.27
It is clear that our measure of completed job duration captures
important variation in worker/job/match quality in both sectors. However,our
procedures do seem to be somewhat more satisfactory for the nonunion sector
than for the union sector. With regard to the estimated returns toseniority,
the estimates in tables 4a and 4b imply roughly equal returns for union and
nonunion workers, but these estimates are based on specifications withno
obvious structural interpretation.
In conclusion, our corrected estimates (in tables 3a and 3b) have the
clear implication that the return to seniority in the union sector is larger
than the return to seniority in the nonunion sector. This finding is
conditional on our measures of union and nonunion job durations, and we do
find some evidence that our union job duration measure is imperfect.However,
even our explorations using less restrictive models (in tables 4a and 4b)
always yield estimated seniority coefficients in the union sector that are at
least as large as the estimated nonunion seniority coefficients. Thus,we
reject the standard finding that the return to seniority is smaller in the
union sector than in the nonunion sector.
27. The test statistics are 6.22 for the union sample and 2.95 for the
nonunion sample, both distributed as F with 2 and just over 3000 degrees of
freedom. The critical values of this distribution are 3.00 at the 5percent
level and 4.61 at the 1 percent level.26
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